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Abstract
Despite the recent advancements in deploying neural
networks for image classification, it has been found that
adversarial examples are able to fool these models leading
them to misclassify the images. Since these models are now
being widely deployed, we provide an insight on the threat
of these adversarial examples by evaluating their character-
istics and transferability to more complex models that utilize
Image Classification as a subtask.
We demonstrate the ineffectiveness of adversarial exam-
ples when applied to Instance Segmentation & Object De-
tection models. We show that this ineffectiveness arises
from the inability of adversarial examples to withstand
transformations such as scaling or a change in lighting con-
ditions. Moreover, we show that there exists a small thresh-
old below which the adversarial property is retained while
applying these input transformations.
Additionally, these attacks demonstrate weak cross-
network transferability across neural network architectures,
e.g. VGG16 and ResNet50, however, the attack may fool
both the networks if passed sequentially through networks
during its formation.
The lack of scalability and transferability challenges the
question of how adversarial images would be effective in
the real world.
1. Introduction
With recent advancements in Computer Vision, Neural
Networks have been able to achieve state-of-the-art results
in Image Recognition and have been able to outperform
human-level performance. The success of Convolutional
Neural Networks [7] ,[18],[6], [19] on the Imagnet [16]
dataset (for the Large-Scale Image Recognition Challenge)
has propelled neural networks to achieve significant results
in various visual recognition tasks. Consequently, they are
now widely deployed at an unprecedented scale across a va-
riety of applications such as Robotics, Drones, Self-Driving
Cars, and Surveillance.
On the other hand, the discovery of adversarial examples
[20], [13], [3] has threatened these achievements by fooling
neural networks to misclassify the image by introducing al-
most visually imperceptible perturbations. Adversarial ex-
amples have been able to fool the state of the Image Classi-
fication models with a high confidence score. as shown in
Figure1 Moreover, [8] showed that adversarial can exist in
the physical world. To put this in perspective, an adversar-
ial image of a stop sign on road could be misclassified as a
green light - thus raising a huge security threat.
As Image classification based models are now being
widely deployed across the industry, it is consequential to
study of the effects of these adversarial perturbations. Keep-
ing in mind the harmful ramifications, in this paper we study
the properties of adversarial examples in real world condi-
tions and evaluate their effectiveness across different neural
networks architectures.
The advancements of neural networks Classification
tasks has propelled research in developing more complex
algorithms such as Object Detection [15], [9] which use Im-
age Classifiers as a subtask and to identify all the objects
in an image, as well as localize their position in the im-
age. Moreover, Instance Segmentation [5] further extends
Object Detection by adding a segmentation pipeline to it,
thus allowing it to not only detect objects but also segment
each pixel on those objects leading to a more fine-grained
classification. With the advent of these complex models,
which use image classification as a sub-task and taking into
account the susceptibility of Image classifiers against ad-
versarial images, it becomes important to study whether the
adversarial image is able to fool these advanced pipelines
as well. With the advent of these complex models and tak-
ing into account the threat of adversarial attacks, it becomes
necessary to examine whether these attacks are able to mis-
lead these complex advanced model pipelines as well.
To study the various properties of adversarial examples
we use the FGSM[3], DeepFool[12], and Carlini & Wag-
ner L2 [1] attacks in a targeted and untargeted setting. To
simulate the real world we a variety of scaling, rotation and
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lighting conditions and demonstrate that these attacks do
not retain their adversarial property under these situations.
Interestingly, we discovered that in case of these transfor-
mations, there exists a minimum threshold below which the
adversarial property is retained and is lost in the latter case.
We then study the transferability of these attacks to various
network architectures on a Cross Network (same dataset,
different architectures) and a Cross Task Transfer (differ-
ent dataset, similar architecture). We notice that adversarial
attack demonstrate weak transferability across different net-
works (VGG, ResNet,etc.) on the ImageNet dataset. More-
over, these transformations deem these attacks ineffective
against Cross Task models such as Object Detection & In-
stance Segmentation models which involve cropping ob-
jects in the image and classifying them individually to their
respective classes. We further chose a third proxy task of
Image Captioning and show that adversarial examples are
not transferable unless the setup is as maintained by [2].
We further extend the study conducted by [11] to In-
stance Segmentation and Captioning models and study the
scalability of attacks in the real world.
(a) Box Turtle (b) African Chameleon
Figure 1: Example of adversarial misclassification
2. Adversarial Attacks
2.1. Fast Gradient Sign Method
The Fast Gradient Sign Method, as introduced by [3] ex-
ploits the linearity of the neural network models in a high di-
mensional space. We used the targeted FGSM attack where
the attacker specifies the adversarial image class, to which
is should be misclassified.
Consider x as the original image, y the corresponding
label of x, θ the parameters of the network and L(θ,x,y) the
loss function used to train the network.
η = sign(∇xL(θ, x, y))
The attack, essentially an optimization problem, tries to
increase the loss of the classifier. It takes the derivative of
the loss function in the x-direction - ∇xL(θ,x,y) and the
sign of the derivative to determine the direction of the pixel
change. The sign term ensures that the loss is maximized.
Moreover, this is multiplied by a small constant , which en-
sures that the perturbation doesnt go too far from the orig-
inal image and restricts its norm that gives us the perturba-
tion η.
This perturbation can now be added to the original image
x to result in the adversarial image, capable of fooling the
classifier.
xadv = x + η For our experiments, we used the Clever-
hans [4] library to generate the adversarial images on pre-
trained Imagenet models with y target set to class ’tennis
ball’ and  set to 0.3.
2.2. DeepFool
The perturbations generated by Deepfool are smaller
than the perturbations compared to FGSM in terms of the
norm but have similar effectiveness in terms of fooling ra-
tios as shown in Figure2. It also reduces the intensity of
the perturbations and was used in the untargeted attacking
case where the attacker can only specify that the adversarial
image is classified differently than the original image.
This method [12] was used to iteratively minimize the
distortion which leads the image to switch classes by pro-
jecting the input image to the closest separating hyperplane
(considering each class of classifier is separated by a hyper-
plane) and by linearizing the decision boundaries in which
the image confines.
For our experiments, we used the Foolbox[14] library
to generate the adversarial images on pre-trained Imagenet
models with 50 iterations and  set to 0.3.
(a) Ballplayer (b) Chain Mail
Figure 2: Example of Original & Adversarial Image Gener-
ated from DeepFool Attack
2.3. Carlini & Wagner L2
The Carlini & Wagner L2 (C&W L2) attack [1] was
introduced to deal with the defensive distillation strategy,
which made the perturbations quasi-imperceptible. Al-
though the distortions produced by C&W L2 are smaller
than the previously mentioned attacks, it is also a slower
attack than FGSM. These attacks limit the perturbation by
restricting their L2 norm.
3. Experimental Setup
In this section we describe the datasets, the deep neural
network models, adversarial attacks methods, the evaluation
metrics and the deep learning frameworks that we used to
carry out our experiments.
3.1. Datasets
In order to generate the adversarial examples, we used
the pre-trained models on the ImageNet dataset. Then, to
evaluate the generated adversarial examples on the Object
detectors and Instance Segmentation models, we used mod-
els pre-trained on the MSCOCO[10] dataset.
For Image Captioning, we used models pre-trained on
the MSCOCO dataset which comprises of 82783 training
images, and 40504 and 40775 validation and test images
respectively with each image corresponding to 5 captions
each.
3.2. Models
For object detection we used the Faster RCNN model
and the RetinaNet models, each using the ResNet 50
pipeline. We also used the Mask RCNN Instance Segmenta-
tion module, which utilizes a Feature Pyramid Network and
a ResNet 101 CNN backbone . Lastly, We used the Image
Captioning pipeline from Show and Tell based on a VGG
16 CNN. The adversarial examples based on the three at-
tacks were generated using VGG16, ResNet 50 and Resnet
101 models pre-trained on the ImageNet dataset.
3.3. Attacks
We employed the FGSM, DeepFool and C&W L2 using
pre-trained models on ImageNet. We have mentioned the
hyperparameters that we used for the respective attacks in
Section 2. We used the FGSM and C&W L2 attacks in a tar-
geted setting whereas the DeepFool attack in an untargeted
setting.
3.4. Metrics
We used Intersection over Union (IoU) as the primary
metric while evaluating Instance Segmentation and Object
Detection models. For Image Classification, we utilized ac-
curacy as a metric. For Image Captioning, we utilized the
BLEU score.
3.5. Deep Learning Frameworks
We used the pretrained models on ImageNet using the
Keras Library which uses Tensorflow backend. In order to
generate the FGSM and C&W L2 attacks, we used the novel
Cleverhans library released by Goodfellow et. al. For the
DeepFool attack we employed the Foolbox library.
4. Characteristics of Adversarial Attacks
To gain complete understanding of Adversarial exam-
ples, we have surveyed some of their properties in this sec-
tion by subjecting them to several scaling, rotation, and
lighting conditions.
4.1. Cropping
For the latter question, we were able to notice that when
the image was cropped from the original size of 224 x 224 to
224 x 223 (1 row cropped), it retained its adversarial prop-
erty. However, it suffered a significant drop in adversarial
confidence score as shown in Figure 3. On further crop-
ping, it loses its attacking capability and the classification
switches back to the original class (Labrador retriever in
this case). This would indicate towards the idea that there
exists a global pattern for each adversarial image that must
be preserved for it to be able to attack classifiers.
(a) 224 x 224 (b) 223 x 224 (c) 223 x 222
Predictions:-
a) tennis ball(75.65%)
b) tennis ball(50.25%)
c) golden retriever(56.49%)
Figure 3: Demonstrates the a) Adversarial Image b) Ad-
versarial Image after 1 row cropped c) Cropped further -
cropping beyong a certain limit causes the image to lose it’s
adversarial class).
4.2. Magnification
Magnification can be considered as a consequence of
cropping as it leads to enlargement of the cropped area and
thus also leads to a loss of attacking ability for the adversar-
ial image as shown in Figure 4.
4.3. Rotation
Similar to cropping and magnification, adversarial im-
ages were not able to maintain their attacking property on
being rotated. We were curious to determine a threshold for
the susceptibility to rotation at which the image would lose
it’s attacking ability. However, we found that the images
lose their attacking capability even with a 1-degree rotation
(in both clockwise and anti-clockwise directions) as shown
in Figure 5.
(a) Adversarial (b) Magnified Adversar-
ial
Predictions:-
a) tennis ball(75.65%)
b) Labrador retriever (52.66%)
Figure 4: The effect of Magnification - In Fig b) magni-
fication magnification causes adversarial image to lose it’s
attacking class
(a) Adversarial Image (b) Rotated Adversarial
Image
Predictions:-
a)tennis ball (75.65%)
b) Labrador retriever (45.20%)
Figure 5: The effect of Rotation - In Fig b) rotation (clock-
wise & anti- clockwise) causes adversarial image to lose it’s
attacking class
4.4. Change in brightness
In order to consider how adversarial images would per-
form in the real world under myriad of lighting conditions,
we subjected these images to change in exposure. Our
experiments show that adversarial examples are robust to
change in exposure and retain their attacking capability un-
til a certain threshold. As demonstrated in Figure 6, a 50%
increase in exposure in the adversarial image retains the ad-
versarial class, but a 100% increase in exposure causes it to
return to its original class.
5. Transferability of Attacks across Architec-
tures
We evaluate the transferability of of adversarial images
across -
1. Cross-Network Transfer: Using different architectures
(a) No change in
brightness
(b) 50% increase (c) 100% increase
Predictions:-
a)tennis ball (75.65%)
b) tennis ball (76.42%)
c) golden retriever (43.11%)
Figure 6: The effect of Brightness - In Fig b) adversarial
image with 50% increase remains adversarial, however in
Fig. c)100% increase reverts to original class
on a common dataset
2. Cross-Task Transfer: Using different architectures on
different datasets
5.1. Cross-Network Transferability
In this section, we investigate how well do adversarial
images generalize over different neural network architec-
tures while keeping the dataset and the task constant. In
order to do this task, we use a computed adversarial image
from one model and use it to attack different model architec-
ture. We tried the following experiment in a targeted attack
setting on various models on the ImageNet dataset.
As demonstrated in Figure 7, we generated the adversar-
ial image using a ResNet 50 based classifier that was able to
fool the ResNet 50 pipeline with high confidence. However,
when we transferred this adversarial image for evaluation
on a different architecture such as the VGG 16, it reverted
to its original (non-adversarial) class.
We were able to achieve similar results while perform-
ing the experiments vice-versa and with other models such
as ResNet 101 and Inception V3. This indicates that the
adversarial examples are weakly transferable across neural
network architectures on the same task.
5.2. Cross-Task Transferability
In order to evaluate Cross Task Transferability, we used
adversarial images generated through pre-trained models
on the ImageNet dataset and evaluate their transferability
across three tasks that have a different model pipeline and
were trained on a different dataset.
5.2.1 Object Detection
We first evaluate our cross-task task transferability on ob-
ject detection models Faster RCNN and RetinaNet which
(a) Original Image (b) Adversarial Image
Predictions:-
a) Resnet 50 - Labrador retriever (58.70 %)
b1) Resnet 50 - tennis ball (75.65%)
b2) VGG 16 - golden retriever (42.38%)
Figure 7: Cross Network Transferability: Fig a) shows the
classification for original image on ResNet 50, for Fig b1)
shows adversarial fooling on ResNet 50, Fig b2) however
when adversarial image is passed to VGG- fails to transfer
and reverts to original class
used ResNet 50 based Image Classification model as a sub-
routine.
Object detection models form bounding boxes over the
objects and then pass it to the classification model - it effec-
tively translates to cropping the objects under the bounding
box leading to classification under different resolutions.
As seen in section 4.1, the cropping operation renders the
adversarial image ineffective for an attack, thus detectors
are not affected by these adversarial images.
The Figure 8 below demonstrates that the adversarial at-
tack has no visible impact on the results of the detection
pipeline.
(a) Original Detection (b) Adversarial Detection
Figure 8: Object detection, with and without adversarial at-
tack.
5.2.2 Instance Segmentation
In order to extend the results obtained on object detectors
in the previous section, we evaluate the attacks on the In-
stance Segmentation models. Despite passing the adversar-
ial image to the models, there is no discernible difference
in the results of the Mask RCNN pipelines between the
original and the adversarial images as shown in Figure 9.
The instance segmentation models utilize object detection
as a subroutine and thus adversarial attack does not cause
a change in result due to the susceptibility to the cropping
operation during formation of the bounding boxes.
(a) Original Inst. Seg-
mentation
(b) Adversarial Inst. Seg-
mentation
Figure 9: Instance Segmentation: with and without Adver-
sarial attack
5.2.3 Image Captioning
Lastly, we assess the transferability of adversarial attacks
to the Image Captioning models. The intent was to rec-
ognize how the adversarial perturbations affect an RNN
based model and how they alter the captions and their se-
mantic properties. For the experiment, we used a cap-
tioning model based on a CNN-LSTM (encoder-decoder)
pipeline,pre-trained on the MSCOCO dataset. The model
used with k beam search inference technique keeping k =1.
Following are some of the results obtained.
(a) Original Image (b) Adversarial Image
Generated Captions:
a) A man flying through the air while riding a snowboard.
(p=0.021026)
b) A person jumping a snow board in the air (p=0.007723)
Figure 10: Demonstrates a) original and b) adversarial im-
age and respective captions generated.
It is apparent in Figures 10 & 11 that the introduction
of adversarial perturbations does not fool the captioning
pipeline as the captions obtained by adversarial and origi-
nal images are identical.
(a) Original Image (b) Adversarial Image
Generated Captions:
a) A baseball player throwing a baseball on a field.
(p=0.001463)
b) A baseball player swinging a bat at a ball (p=0.001510)
Figure 11: Demonstrates a) original and b) adversarial im-
age and respective captions generated.
5.3. Attacks Capable of Fooling Multiple Networks
As an extension of the study described in section 5.1, we
examined whether adversarial examples could fool multiple
network architectures simultaneously.
We passed the adversarial image generated from one
model architecture as the input for generation to the next
model architecture. In several cases, we discovered that the
resulting adversarial image was capable of fooling both the
networks architectures.
In the image below, we carried out the aforementioned
process by generating the adversarial image using a ResNet
50 pipeline. We then transferred it for generation using a
VGG16 model and found that the resulting image was able
to fool both the classification models (tennis ball (99.49%)
against vgg16 and tennis ball (67.52%) against resnet 50).
However, the resulting image also experienced more vi-
sual distortion. This experiment would also suggest that it
might possible to devise an adversarial example, capable of
fooling all the major neural network architectures.
6. Future Work
In this section, we suggest some directions for future re-
searchers to consider -
6.1. Change Loss Function in Object Detection &
Instance Segmentation
As demonstrated by Chen et. al that adversarial images
can be transferred to Image Captioning models by altering
the loss function of the model. Whether similar results can
be achieved on Object Detectors and Instance Segmentation
models remains to be seen.
6.2. Effect of adversarial examples on Generative
models
So far, adversarial images have been widely deployed
against discriminative models. However, the effects of ad-
versarial examples on generative models such as Genera-
tive Adversarial Networks and Autoencoders needs to be
researched. Xiao et al. [21] and [17] showed how GANs
can be employed for adversarial attack and defense respec-
tively. However detailed studies on VAEs and GANs for
adversarial images have yet to be conducted. One question
that needs to be answered is whether adversarial examples
can be generated on a large scale using generative models
without a loss of clarity and attacking ability.
6.3. Effect of precision on adversarial examples
Most of the existing research on adversarial examples
has been carried out on 32-bit float models. As most vision
models in real-life applications are being deployed using
lower precision of these neural networks weights such as
16-bit float or 8-bit integer. It would be intriguing to exam-
ine the effects of adversarial examples with lower precision
going down till binary.
6.4. Comparison of network architectures instead
of fooling capability
Another possible direction would the effect of adversar-
ial examples against various neural network architectures.
It is important to see how various attacks fare against dif-
ferent architectures; which architectures are able to defend
against these attacks better.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we showed that adversarial examples are
weakly transferable across neural network architectures es-
pecially in more complex vision tasks. Using the FGSM,
DeepFool and C&W L2 attacks, we evaluated the cross-
network transferability of adversarial images across net-
work architectures on the ImageNet dataset. We extended
our study whether these attacks are transferable to more
complex Computer Vision tasks such as Instance Segmen-
tation and Object Detection
As in the real world, adversarial images may be encoun-
tered in a variety of scale and lighting conditions we sub-
jected these images to various input transformations such
as cropping, magnification, rotation, and change in lighting
conditions. We found that there exists a threshold beyond
which they lose their adversarial property (example- if an
image is cropped beyond a few pixels). As a result, adver-
sarial images fail to fool object detection, instance segmen-
tation, and image captioning models. We also found that
when an adversarial image is generated sequentially across
two networks, it may be able to fool the networks simulta-
neously.
Our work shows due to the lack of transferability and
scalability of adversarial examples, they are yet to become
a threat in the real world and are currently only effective in
controlled experiments.
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